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Abstract
The share of national income going to workers has decreased steadily across
Europe since the 1980s. This apparently uniform decrease in labour’s share conceals
differences amongst states however—in ‘liberal’ Ireland, this fall has been drastic,
while that of ‘social democratic’ Denmark has been moderate. This article presents a
parallel time series analysis of institutional and structural factors shaping labour’s
share in Ireland and Denmark. Our results show that factors common to the study of
variation in labour’s share operate in different ways in different countries, both in
magnitude and causal mechanism. We find that stressors such as global trade, for-
eign investment and high-tech growth produce different effects in each location.
Equally, protections such as unionization, leftist cabinets and welfare spending dis-
play contradictory effects in both locations. We conclude that ‘power resource’ mod-
els of labour share should be supplemented with comparative approaches that
emphasize how institutionalized socio-political logics mediate returns to labour.
Key words: labour share, national income, comparative, time series, power resources, Ireland,
Denmark
JEL classification: O57 Comparative Studies of Countries, D33 Factor Income Distribution, D63
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
1. Introduction
The question of inequality in capitalist societies is back on the political agenda. Most fa-
mously through Tomas Piketty (2014), social science research has paid increasing attention
to inequalities between the very wealthiest and ‘the rest’, after a period when most attention
focussed on the inequalities within ‘the rest’. This article joins this debate, investigating the
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distribution of national income between capital and labour in Denmark and Ireland, two
small open European economies.
Analyses of labour share are an important complement to more common studies of income
inequality: those focused on the distribution of income within ‘labour’, and those of wealth in-
equality, focused mainly within ‘capital’. In each case, labour share extends the perspective in
important ways. In practice (if not in theory) the labour share in any society defines the bound-
aries of the pool of resources that is to be distributed within the national distribution of income.
In studies of income inequality, it is typically a largely hidden dimension of national distribu-
tional patterns. While studies of wealth inequalities extend their frame of reference to assets,
they largely ignore the stream of income that derives from that wealth, particularly the owner-
ship of capital that enables productive investments and financial trading. Labour share therefore
represents a critical linking element in overall systems of distribution (Atkinson, 2009).
Literature on labour’s share has shed significant light on causes of the uneven distribu-
tion of national income. However, this literature only touches indirectly on the different con-
figurations of these factors in different national contexts, a task that can only be adequately
undertaken within a comparative framework. This article presents a case-centered approach,
based on parallel time series analyses of institutional and structural determinants of labour’s
share in Ireland and Denmark. We bring together analysis of the structural reorganization
and distributional politics of capital and labour that has been central to debates around la-
bour share (Kristal, 2010), with analysis of the effects of institutional configurations of na-
tional production, welfare regimes and labour markets that has been the focus of
comparative political economy (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001).
We make three main arguments. First, we show that while there is clearly a broad trend to-
wards an increasing share of income going to capital, the degree, direction and patterns of
change vary significantly across countries. In contrast to the emphasis in the bulk of the labour
share literature on common factors that shape distributional outcomes, we argue for an analysis
of the interaction of configurations of factors within national societies. Our analysis develops
this approach through a comparative political economy of labour’s share of national income in
the Irish and Danish economies, representing ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ models of capital-
ism, respectively. Secondly, we show that the dynamics of these two cases contradict the expect-
ations of not only general economic models but also ‘power resources’ and (earlier and later)
‘varieties of capitalism’ (VOC) approaches. Our analysis suggests that the distribution of na-
tional income can only be understood within the context of broader national ‘trade-offs’, ‘social
contracts’ or ‘worlds of capitalism’ which themselves represent differing responses to the chal-
lenges of contemporary liberalization (Thelen, 2014), although we depart somewhat from
Thelen’s account of those varying responses. Thirdly, we argue that parallel time series analyses
of national cases are essential to reveal these comparative differences in the political economy of
capital and labour, differences that are obscured by the more conventional pooled time series
analyses whose strength is identifying the cross-contextual effects of causal factors.
2. The comparative political economy of labour share
The trend towards labour’s declining share of income across the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), with few exceptions such as Japan, is no longer in
doubt. The share of national income going to employees and the self-employed has decreased
steadily across the USA and Europe since the 1980s, under the apparent combined pressure of
2 Eoin Flaherty and Sea´n O´ Riain
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/m
w
y047/5301501 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 08 July 2019
globalization, sectoral shifts in national employment and policies of economic liberalization.
Figure 1 (below) illustrates aggregate trends across Europe since 1960. In contrast to the rela-
tively constant downward trend in the US, European labour shares exhibit a characteristic
‘hump-shaped’ distribution, with labour’s share of income peaking during the early 1980s, be-
fore embarking on a sustained, albeit punctuated, period of decline. This apparently uniform
decrease in aggregate labour shares conceals a variety of contrasting dynamics amongst indi-
vidual European states as demonstrated in Figure 2. States thus differ not only in their levels of
labour share, but also in their trends and fluctuations over time. In Ireland, for example, the
long-term fall was dramatic, while that of Denmark has been comparatively moderate.
Furthermore, while declines in labour’s share of national income are generally associated with
rising inequality within incomes (Flaherty, 2015), this is not always the case (Trott, 2013;
International Labour Organization, 2015). As such, Denmark can sustain a lower relative level
of labour share than Ireland, while recording a more equitable personal income distribution.
de Serres et al. (2002) have attributed labour share reductions to the growing importance
of capital-intensive activities such as financial services, coupled with shifts in domestic
manufacturing toward outsourcing, with consequent wage depression. By these ‘standard’
accounts, aggregate labour share declines throughout the 1990s simply reflect a fall in the
supply of unskilled labour, along with widespread increases in employment, which have out-
paced growth in real compensation per worker (Giscina, 2006 p. 11; Jaumotte and Tytell,
2007 p. 9). However, Whelan and Lawless (2011 p. 132) have demonstrated that sectoral
shifts toward lower labour share activites accounted for less than 1% of the decline in la-
bour share between 1980 and 2005. Furthermore, the distribution of factor shares within
sectors themselves often changes over time, suggesting that institutional and political factors
Figure 1. Pooled unit-mean labour share trends (EU-27), 1960–2011.
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play a more substantial role in labour share declines. This is where a comparative political
economy approach can advance debate on the institutional determinants of labour’s share
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Hall and Gingerich, 2009). The rest of this section outlines
our distinctive approach before explaining how we tackle this question along three different
dimensions—the contingent effects of economic organization, the incorporation of labour
into that economic system, and the institutional and political conditions shaping this eco-
nomic organization and labour incorporation. Nonetheless, it is important to note from the
outset that our focus is not on comparing the relative effects of economic, labour market
and political variables (as in Kristal (2010) for example). Instead, our primary task is to
compare how these groups of variables operate in different ways, allowing us to examine
the different dynamics within and between countries.
2.1 Understanding comparative differences between worlds of capitalism
There is already a growing body of literature on how a range of institutional and structural
factors such as union density, strike activity, leftist national government and components of
government spending shape labour’s share of income, alongside the general trend towards eco-
nomic liberalism (Wallace et al., 1999; Diwan, 2001; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Guscina,
2006; Ellis and Smith, 2007; Decreuse and Maarek, 2008; Kristal, 2010). Kristal (2010) pro-
vides the most comprehensive attempt to integrate these dimensions. Her model involves
decomposing labour’s share into its constituents—compensation, employment and productiv-
ity—while further dividing working class organizational power into economic, political and
global spheres (Kristal, 2010 p. 738). Elsewhere, Bengtsson shows similar findings, albeit a
weak effect of unionization on labour’s share in Nordic countries, consistent with theories
Figure 2 European labour share trends (states with complete adjusted series), 1960–2011.
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which stress moderated wage demands amongst countries with higher union densities (2014a,
pp. 404–405). Stockhammer (2017) expands the analysis beyond affluent democracies, show-
ing how globalization correlates negatively with wage shares in developing nations.
On Sweden, Bengtsson (2014b) shows how changes in labour’s share were conditioned by
strong wage growth in the 1960s (outstripping productivity), followed by a ‘crisis phase’ of
wage restraint and currency devaluation. The standard ‘skill bias’ argument is also contra-
dicted in Austrian research, lending support for a political economy explanation (Guschanski
and Onaran, 2016). The existing literature is much weaker in explaining the particular forms
of bargain that exist in different national, institutional and political contexts however—espe-
cially so in the case of pooled analyses—which we suggest may be addressed through a com-
parative approach. Power resources do not assume universal forms nor result unambiguously
in increased labour share but must be understood through the filter of national-level regimes
and their mix of trade-offs over key political and policy domains. Our analysis thus combines
the labour share literature’s focus on the class relations at the heart of capitalism with the
interacting institutional complexes that are the central explanatory factors in the comparative
political economy of welfare and production regimes.
Despite many critiques, the dominant orienting framework in comparative political econ-
omy remains the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ perspective (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Leaving
aside broader issues with the perspective, there are several reasons why this perspective
offers a useful starting point, and foil, for the comparative political economy of labour
share. First, since the perspective focuses on production regimes and economic competitive-
ness, its primary distributional focus is on market risks and rewards rather than on welfarist
redistribution (with important exceptions such as Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). This brings
it relatively close to the object of labour share analysis. Secondly, it offers a ‘configurational’
account of national political economies, distinguishing between relatively distinct coordi-
nated market economies (CMEs), in which government and state institutions play a central
guiding role, and liberal market economies (LMEs) in which the organization of labour and
dynamics of growth are mediated primarily through markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall
and Gingerich, 2009). Denmark and Ireland offer relatively clear examples of each type, al-
beit with some reservations (O´ Riain, 2014). Thirdly, we can derive a set of guiding predic-
tions for each of our models. LMEs should move more quickly than CMEs towards the
dynamics of innovation-led endogenous growth. Workers with ‘general assets’ (e.g. trade-
able skills in the market) will gain greater rewards in LMEs, whereas those with ‘specific
assets’ (e.g. firm- or sector-specific skills, generally realized in unionized or other protected
settings) will get a better share of income in CMEs. Politically, the original VOC literature
would expect that workers will benefit significantly more from unionization, welfare and left
government in CMEs than in LMEs.
The clarity of this picture of the ‘old’ VOC is complicated by Thelen’s (2014) reformula-
tion of ‘varieties of liberalisation’. Thelen argues that coordination capacities have been fur-
ther reduced in liberal economies as they have deregulated, suggesting that the key
influences on distributional outcomes in liberal economies will be at the level of production
regimes rather than welfare or macroeconomic factors. However, the direct action of the
state becomes more important in social democracies as the social foundations of production
and welfare bargains become more fragile—indeed, she points to Denmark as a particularly
clear example of such a directly interventionist role for the state (Thelen, 2014). To some ex-
tent, Thelen turns the established analysis on its head—it is now specific interventions by the
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state in social democracies and by employers (especially) and worker groups in liberal econ-
omies that shape distributional outcomes.
In our analysis, therefore, we develop this comparative political economy of labour share
through three models that compare the effects of endogenous economic growth, labour in-
corporation and political–institutional context on labour share in social democratic and lib-
eral national political economies. We also offer an account that synthesises the findings from
all three models into an analysis of how similar economic, social and institutional factors
can have quite different distributional effects in such different national contexts. Such a fo-
cus on the configuration and dynamics of regimes is essential, given our findings in separate
models that similar factors can have quite different effects in the two case countries. The rest
of this section introduces the logic behind the three models.
2.2 Endogenous economic growth
The share of national income going to labour is a ‘constant’ in neoclassical economic growth
models, which should not fluctuate but remain in equilibrium (Solow, 1958; Mankiw, 2007;
Zuleta 2012, p. 91). Other economists have drawn attention to the changing nature of capi-
tal and labour, through the growth of unincorporated enterprises, human capital endow-
ments or labour substitution and technology (Arpaia et al., 2009; Zuleta, 2012).
Nonetheless, largely implicitly, the literature on labour share has assumed that the ‘factors
of production’ themselves, including the technology ‘residual’, are fixed or exogenous to the
model (Solow, 1958) and thus sit outside of politics and institutions.
More recent developments in endogenous growth theory call specifically for attention to
‘ . . . the private and public sector choices that cause the rate of growth of the residual to
vary across countries’ (Romer, 1994). In these accounts, the institutional makeup, and state
policy choices of a country are central to its growth capacity. Endogenous growth theory
emphasizes trade as a precursor to growth, but also policies that drive research and innova-
tion. Our first model examines the effect of trade, which exposes firms and workers to the
opportunities and pressures of international competition. To this we add the proportion of
information technology jobs within the economy, as the growing importance of high-tech
activities, such as the software sector in Ireland and Danish biotechnology, has been a cru-
cial feature of recent decades. The high skill profile of much of this work has promoted up-
ward wage pressures in most technology-intensive sectors, generating a wage premium for
highly skilled, mobile workers (Daudey and Decreuse, 2006; Hardiman et al., 2008).
While Kristal (2013) finds that computerization reduces labour share, this finding is com-
patible with our expectation that an increased share of IT jobs will increase labour share.
Kristal’s measure captures the overall effect of IT on the labour force (e.g. incorporating au-
tomation and other effects), while our measure captures the growth of a group of workers
who can command significant rewards in the labour market. Some of Kristal’s analysis of
changing technological conditions is captured in our analysis of increased employment in
services as a whole. This has tended to weaken unions by reducing the importance of their
historically ‘core’ memberships of industrial employees, while certain service sub-sectors
such as retail have seen a proliferation of casual employment, making coordinated bargain-
ing beyond firm level particularly difficult (Hardiman et al., 2008). Finally, we include a
measure of inflation as a control for business cycle effects in the generation of labour share
fluctuations (Harrison, 2005, p. 26). This measure also tests the efficacy of the ‘wage-lag
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hypothesis’, which suggests that compensation lags behind productivity, decreasing labour’s
share as inflation and output rise (Raffalovich et al., 1992, p. 255).
2.3 Labour incorporation
We also consider structural changes in the composition of the labour force and its modes of
incorporation into employment (Harrison, 2005; Daudey and Decreuse, 2006; Jaumotte
and Tytell, 2007; Jayadev, 2007). The incorporation of new ‘labour pools’, such as women
and migrants, into the economy may well transform the politics of capital and labour with
both by altering the skill composition of labour forces and through differing ‘modes of in-
corporation’. These are key conditions frequently invoked in ‘power resources’ models of in-
equality. Given that significant gender and ethnic wage inequalities remain, female labour
force participation and migrant employment influence labour share in a national economy
through the accession of workers to occupations often of low security of tenure, and with
weaker bargaining power over working conditions. The overall labour market conditions
under which labour is incorporated into employment may also have a significant effect. We
examine the impact of both hours worked in the economy, as a measure of overall labour
participation and mobilization, and of unemployment rates, examining whether high unem-
ployment tips the balance of power fairly firmly towards capital in negotiating the distribu-
tion of capital’s rewards. To account for the predominant role of multinationals in Irish
labour markets, and their negative influence on unionization, we include our foreign invest-
ment measure in the Irish models also.
2.4 Political–institutional context
Power resource frameworks provide compelling evidence that the resources of relevant class
actors are critical in explaining labour’s share of capitalism’s rewards (Korpi, 1983). In
keeping with this approach, we develop a political–institutional model, alongside our previ-
ous economic and labour incorporation models. We start with two measures of the power
of capital and labour. Increased levels of foreign direct investment typically reduces labour
share as mobile capital generally enjoys lower relocation costs relative to labour, and there-
fore can seek out greater returns from beyond its host economy or use this capability in do-
mestic bargaining (Harrison, 2005; Decreuse and Maarek, 2008; Hutchinson and Persyn,
2009). The collective organization of workers is captured through the rate of unionisation,
which typically serves to increase labour’s bargaining power—both through the imminent
threat of strike action, and by representing members’ interests in wage bargaining processes
(Wallace et al., 1999; Daudey and Decreuse, 2006; Guscina, 2006; Jayadev, 2007; Jaumotte
and Tytell, 20007; Kristal, 2010).
Two other variables relate to the political context in which capital and labour play out
their struggles to shape market outcomes. Political partisanship is often crucial to the bar-
gaining power of labour, insofar as national legislatures with predominantly leftist members
should tend to enact legislation, and adopt policy positions more favourable to labour’s
interests. However, there is also evidence that unions and left parties have quite different
effects, with union strength most affecting wage and other working conditions while left par-
tisan success affects welfare and other social policies (Jensen, 2012). Indeed, a substantial
body of literature exists addressing the welfare provision strategies of small open economies,
captured by levels of social spending. Welfare may boost labour share by providing a ‘re-
serve wage’ that strengthens labour’s bargaining power and social policies that enhance
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workers’ skills and productivity. However, the relationship may be more complex, as small
states typically use welfare to both compensate for globalization pressures and to trade off
against wage competitiveness (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 47). Our choice of cases is highly rele-
vant here as Denmark is a clear case of historical ‘social compensation’ while Ireland repre-
sents a ‘liberal’ exception with a small open economy but comparatively low welfare effort.
3. Methodology: comparative time series
We noted at the outset that one contribution of this article was methodological, as we under-
take a parallel time series comparing two national societies from 1960 to 2012. In this sec-
tion we explain that approach, focusing on our comparative time series analysis and the
definition of the labour share variable.
3.1 Analytical strategy: parallel time series
The theoretical approach outlined above requires a different methodological approach than
in most of the labour share literature which either focuses on single countries (typically the
US) or pooled time series across multiple countries. We develop parallel time series analyses
of single countries allowing us to explore possible divergences in the manner in which ex-
planatory factors influence long-term labour share dynamics in both economies, divergences
that are obscured when pooled data is used. Investigations of income and labour share dis-
tribution often utilize pooled observations across multiple countries, in order to maximize
sample sizes for panel estimation techniques, and to recover degrees of freedom, thus permit-
ting the inclusion of more predictors than is typically possible with single-unit time series
models (Lee 2005; Jaumotte and Tytell 2007; Kristal, 2010; Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2010;
Volscho and Kelly, 2012). However, time-series analysis, in contrast to typical cross-
sectional quantitative work, permits a form of ‘case-intensive’ investigation, which calls for
sensitivity to historical nuance both in terms of model specification and interpretation.
Where such contextual aspects of the analysis can be obscured in pooled analyses (Schrank,
2013), our approach maximizes our sensitivity to the interaction of various factors in differ-
ent national contexts. A strong version of this argument would suggest that pooled time se-
ries models had less value in understanding comparative differences in labour share.
However, there is sufficient overlap between the general patterns in, for example, Kristal’s
(2010) analysis and our own that we prefer to see the approaches as broadly complemen-
tary, although there is a need for further exploration of case-specific patterns.
We choose our cases to examine the combination of insitutions and policy structures
which constitute Ireland and Denmark as ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ ideal types. This
nuance is typically missed in analyses which adopt a pooled time series approach.
Nonetheless, there are important historical and structural similarities between the countries
that provide a solid basis for our comparative analysis of more short-range differences. Both
countries are small open economies, historically formed from smallholder agricultural social
structures and who joined the European Economic Community together in 1973. Similarly,
both have operated under the policies of economic and monetary union since the late 1990s,
and although Denmark is not a member of the eurozone, it has arguably followed the rele-
vant policies more closely than Ireland. Despite these similarities, Ireland and Denmark are
located in very different mappings of ‘varieties of capitalism’ and ‘worlds of welfare capital-
ism’ (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Blanchard and Giavazzi,
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2003). Although sometimes conceived of as ‘hybrid’ cases (Campbell and Pedersen, 2007),
there are still clear institutional differences between the countries. On conventional meas-
ures, Ireland falls short of Denmark in terms of coordination in labour relations and corpo-
rate governance as well as product market deregulation (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003;
Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Furthermore, some of the ‘hybrid’ features of the two countries
are more typical of their worlds of capitalism than is often thought—for example, relatively
flexible labour markets are a feature of most Social Democracies and not just Denmark,
while sectional union strategies are a common feature of liberal economies (O´ Riain, 2014).
Furthermore, most Liberal political economies are either former empires and their common-
wealths, or relatively newly capitalist countries. Therefore, Ireland’s experience of rapid de-
velopment and structural change is likely to be a relatively common feature of Liberal
economies (e.g. the new Liberal political economies of Eastern Europe).
Nonetheless, in pursuing this comparison, it is also important that we do not conceive of
these economies’ structures as homogenous, static or captured by the label assigned to them
by our typology of choice. While we are confident that these countries are broadly represen-
tative of liberal and social democratic capitalisms, we also conceptualize each nation’s politi-
cal economy as a dynamic configuration during the latter half of the 20th century. Ireland’s
liberal trajectory has been punctuated with important elements of state intervention. These
included social partnership agreements from 1987 to 2008, which reached beyond issues of
wage setting alone to incorporate civic associations with implicit agendas of social inclusion
(Teague, 2006, 2009), and the actions of the Irish ‘developmental network state’ in the
realm of industrial policy (O´ Riain, 2000, 2004). Similarly, Denmark has a famously flexible
labour market, combined with measures to promote income security and re-employment.
Therefore, a specific consideration of the evolving institutional space of economic activity is
central to any interpretation of the dynamics of returns to labour. Indeed, the ability to as-
sess this mixture of coherence and internal complexity that is common to all national politi-
cal economies is one of the strengths of the parallel case study approach. To this end, the
historical scope of the data employed in these analyses incorporate a number of distinct,
characteristic phases of economic development, and regimes of industrial and social policy
formulation.
3.2 Variables
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the analysis and of the data sources
(see the previous section for a conceptual discussion). However, the labour share variable it-
self requires a more extended discussion. The first question relates to the definition of labour
itself. It has become customary to include a correction for incomes of the self-employed, typ-
ically assumed to reside at the average rate of compensation of either the sectoral, or na-
tional workforce. Following this convention, labour shares were calculated by adding an
estimate of compensation of the self-employed, (multiplying numbers of self-employed by
nominal compensation per employee), which was added to national accounts ‘compensation
of employees’ to provide an overall measure of labour’s income.
The definition of ‘national income’ also involves several choices. While Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is conventionally taken as the measure of national income, it poses different
problems for each of these two countries. GDP in Ireland is highly inflated by the activities
of multinational corporations, including transfer pricing and related corporate accounting
practices (Barry, 2005, 2006). Conversely in Denmark, GDP underestimates national
Labour’s share in Ireland and Denmark 9
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income due to the formation of very substantial private pension funds managed by unions
and employer associations in recent decades. The net effect of these arrangements is that of a
considerable mismatch in each country between domestically generated and domestically ap-
propriated value. Gross National Income (GNI) provides a better measure for both countries
of the income realized in each nation in each particular year, and we use GNI as the denomi-
nator in our measure.
GNI is only 85.54% of GDP for Ireland, and is 110.06% for Denmark. In Ireland, it is
estimated that only 40% of this gap between GNI and GDP consists of genuine economic
activity in Ireland (IFAC, 2012). The net effect of adopting GNI as our measure is that of a
more modest rate of labour share decline across the historical span of the Irish series relative
to that of Kristal (2010), and a marginally greater overall Irish average (63.9%) than that of
the European Commission (2007), which has estimated Ireland’s average labour share at
62.1%. Figures 3 and 4 show that both sets of estimates exhibit broad parity until the 1980s
after which Ireland’s expanding, globalized productive base begins to significantly underesti-
mate returns to labour based on GDP alone. The difference is less significant in Denmark
but we use GNI in that case also for consistency. This offers a crucial corrective to existing
studies which have relied on a GDP-denominator in their calculation of labour share in
countries with strong multinational presence. It also means that our estimates of labour
share decline in Ireland are quite conservative.
3.3 Modelling approach
Our analysis consists of a series of error correction models (ECMs) specified across our three
domains of macro-economic, labour incorporation and political–institutional factors and re-
peated for both Ireland and Denmark. These are much-utilized specifications in the study of
inequality (Kristal, 2010; Volscho and Kelly, 2012), and are appropriate in the presence of
non-stationarity and cointegration. The type of relationship typically observed in analyses of
income distribution often approximates that of an ‘error correction’ relationship in which ‘
. . . deviations from the long-run relationship (errors) are eliminated over time through an
adjustment process (error corrections)’ (Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 688). A single equation
ECM consists of an autoregressive independent variable (a1Yt1), and a series of additional
predictors which model both short and long-term effects. In this case, a ‘first differenced’
term captures the short term, instantaneous effects of changes in the level of predictors
(b1DXti), while a lagged term captures the long-run effect (b1Xt1). The complete model
includes a first-differenced dependent variable (Dyt) as follows;
Dyt ¼ a0 þ a1yt1 þ b1DXti þ b2Xt1 þ t
Consequently, the above specification permits the incorporation of both short and long-
term effects (Busemeyer, 2009; Kristal, 2010, p. 744), treatment of cointegration, a parsimo-
nious representation of the system dynamics. With regard to the mechanics of model estima-
tion, a ‘Box-Jenkins’ approach was adopted, which involves beginning with a parsimonious
model containing a limited number of explanatory variables, and progressively adding and
removing variables based both on theoretical, and statistical criteria (i.e. t-statistic magni-
tude). This means that on at least one of the models the final specification reported includes
different variables for the two countries, although each model for each country started out
with the same specification. This procedure continued iteratively for each individual model,
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Figure 3. Labour’s share of national income (Ireland), GDP and GNI denominator, 1960–2012.
Figure 4. Labour’s share of national income (Denmark), GDP and GNI denominator, 1960–2012.
Labour’s share in Ireland and Denmark 13
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/m
w
y047/5301501 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 08 July 2019
until a point of saturation, or diminishing returns was reached, the threshold of which was
judged on the basis of information criteria (AIC) and parameter significance. All models
were estimated by ordinary least squares, with robust standard errors, and constructed
according to the same essential ECM structure as detailed in the above equation.
4. Understanding the comparative dynamics of labour share
We begin our analysis with a more systematic look at the changes in labour share in our
case countries. We can better quantify the scale of this variation in specific historical epochs
between both countries by regressing and plotting a succession of period-specific trend dum-
mies. The coefficient on these partial models in Figure 5 indicates the rate of reduction
within each period. Ireland and Denmark have experienced similar periods of growth and
decline in labour share, although with very different magnitudes in those trends. While
Ireland exhibits faster growth between 1960 and 1980, Denmark adjusts consistently to-
ward a more stable rate of decline. As Ireland’s labour share drops 1.5% per year between
1994 and 2001, Denmark’s is reduced by 0.4% per annum. Overall, Ireland’s series is decid-
edly more volatile. This volatility is borne out by the fact that Ireland’s series exhibits stron-
ger responsiveness to key points of macroeconomic instability and change, such as the oil
crisis of the mid-1970’s, the recession of the 1980’s, and the recent financial crisis. Although
showing comparable variation until the early 1980s albeit at differing relative levels,
Ireland’s subsequent decline is significantly sharper.
Our core explanatory analysis of these trends is based on the time series models pre-
sented in Table 2. We discuss each model in separate sections. Oour discussion provides an
analytical overview and explores the configurational dynamics of each country in more de-
tail. It is worth noting at the outset that there is considerable overlap between the results
reported here and those of Kristal’s (2010), Bengtsson (2014b) and Stockhammer’s (2017)
pooled time series analysis. With only one exception (which we discuss later), any of the var-
iables in Kristal’s analysis which are also used in our analysis exhibit a similar sign and sig-
nificance in at least one of the countries in our analysis.
4.1 Macro-economy
One of the most striking divergences between the Irish and Danish results (see Table 2, col-
umns 1 and 4) is the opposing direction of the effect of global trade volume, which records
long-term significance in both models. In pooled analyses, the negative effect of global trade
on labour’s share is often explained by a depression of domestic wages through competition
from low-wage competitor countries and cheap input costs. Others have suggested greater
capital output, under the increased mobility endowed by capital account openness, may dis-
proportionately raise rents (Jayadev, 2007). The process of ‘marketisation’ reflected in the
trade variable is itself multi-faceted however, and can take different forms, depending in
part on the strategies pursued, and in part on the institutions through which such strategies
are realized. Even in two small open economies such as Denmark and Ireland, there are sig-
nificant differences in export strategy, one based on promoting domestic and international
market competition among small and medium sized Danish enterprises, and another based
on participation in the international competition for mobile investment, as has been central
to Irish development.
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Opposing signs on service sector employment are also recorded. These are not statisti-
cally significant in either model and as such, should be treated as tentative. When considered
alongside the effects of computer sector employment some comparative inferences may how-
ever be drawn. Typically, the growth of service sector employment has been associated with
a dilution of union membership away from its core bases of industrial employment, a weak-
ening of contractual security, and the accession of women and migrants to employment with
low levels of regulation. These depressive effects of service sector growth have occured in the
Irish context, despite associated workforce upskilling and moderate real wage growth.
Conversely, Danish services employment has enjoyed relative security from the effects of
outsourcing and subcontracting. In finance and utilities, Danish labour has managed to re-
tain a unified wage structure under market segmentation and firm rationalization, resulting
in both high-performance labour flexibility, and wage stability with union bargaining cen-
tering on wage structures, and working time arrangements (Sorensen and Weinkopf, 2009).
It is liberal Ireland however, where we might expect workers do worse in securing a share of
income from broad, general processes of marketization, and where bargaining power is
more individually and sectorally concentrated in the absence of wider social partnerships.
This is reflected in the effect of IT sector employment.
The expansion of the computer sector has boosted labour’s share in both countries, al-
though to a significantly greater degree in Ireland. Given that bargaining power within such
sectors often resides with the employee rather than the firm, the accumulation of valuable
skills in a flexible labour market suggests a shift in the bargaining capacities of such labour-
ers relative to those of capital (Daudey and Decreuse, 2006). While the effect is stronger in
‘liberal’ Ireland, the benefits of marketization for labour in liberal economies depend most
heavily on the prevalence of ‘high road’ sectors within the service economy. In Denmark, the
effects of high-tech growth are smaller, although still strongly positive. In this case, however,
they are combined with much stronger positive effects of general transitions towards export-
ing and non-manufacturing employment. In short, similar marketization processes have
Figure 5. Period-specific linear trend coefficients, 1960–2010.
Labour’s share in Ireland and Denmark 15
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/m
w
y047/5301501 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 08 July 2019
T
ab
le
2
E
rr
o
r-
co
rr
ec
tio
n
m
o
d
el
s
o
fl
ab
o
u
r
sh
ar
e
D
ls
(L
ab
ou
r
sh
ar
e,
G
N
Id
en
om
in
at
or
)
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
1.
M
ac
ro
-
ec
on
om
ic
2.
L
ab
ou
r
m
ar
ke
t
3.
Po
lit
ic
al
-
ec
on
om
ic
4.
M
ac
ro
-
ec
on
om
ic
5.
L
ab
ou
r
m
ar
ke
t
6.
Po
lit
ic
al
-
ec
on
om
ic
ls
t–
1
–0
.2
59
*
–1
.4
85
*
–0
.5
99
**
–0
.7
04
**
–0
.3
59
*
–0
.4
39
**
D
T
ra
de
–5
.6
83
4.
96
4
T
ra
de
t–
1
–1
1.
53
4*
*
13
.6
95
**
D
Se
rv
ic
e
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
–0
.0
96
0.
19
3
Se
rv
ic
e
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
t–
1
–0
.5
70
þ
0.
14
2
D
IT
se
ct
or
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
17
3*
0.
08
9*
IT
se
ct
or
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
t–
1
0.
17
6*
0.
10
5
D
In
fla
ti
on
–0
.3
79
**
–0
.0
02
In
fla
ti
on
t–
1
0.
03
9
–0
.4
23
**
D
Fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
m
en
t
–1
.4
93
–0
.0
69
**
–0
.0
05
Fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
m
en
t t–
1
–0
.0
61
þ
–0
.0
07
D
M
ig
ra
nt
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
–0
.1
07
0.
19
3
M
ig
ra
nt
em
pl
oy
m
en
t t–
1
–0
.1
61
*
0.
26
7
D
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
83
0*
0.
59
9*
**
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t t–
1
D
T
ot
al
ho
ur
s
w
or
ke
d
–0
.0
17
–0
.0
29
þ
T
ot
al
ho
ur
s
w
or
ke
d
t–
1
D
Fe
m
al
e
la
bo
ur
fo
rc
e
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
0.
41
4*
Fe
m
al
e
la
bo
ur
fo
rc
e
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
t–
1
0.
06
1
Fe
m
al
e
la
bo
ur
fo
rc
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
83
–9
4 t
–1
–0
.2
88
D
L
ef
tp
ar
ty
in
ca
bi
ne
t
0.
03
2
–0
.0
95
þ
co
nt
in
ue
d
16 Eoin Flaherty and Sea´n O´ Riain
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/m
w
y047/5301501 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 08 July 2019
T
ab
le
2
C
on
ti
nu
ed
D
ls
(L
ab
ou
r
sh
ar
e,
G
N
Id
en
om
in
at
or
)
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
1.
M
ac
ro
-
ec
on
om
ic
2.
L
ab
ou
r
m
ar
ke
t
3.
Po
lit
ic
al
-
ec
on
om
ic
4.
M
ac
ro
-
ec
on
om
ic
5.
L
ab
ou
r
m
ar
ke
t
6.
Po
lit
ic
al
-
ec
on
om
ic
L
ef
tp
ar
ty
in
ca
bi
ne
t
t–
1
–0
.1
35
*
0.
00
0
D
U
ni
on
de
ns
it
y
0.
00
3
0.
10
1
U
ni
on
de
ns
it
y t
–1
0.
22
3*
0.
14
2*
D
W
el
fa
re
sp
en
di
ng
0.
81
7
0.
64
0*
W
el
fa
re
sp
en
di
ng
t–
1
.2
81
–0
.3
02
*
C
on
st
an
t
52
.3
65
*
10
9.
31
6*
25
.5
16
**
14
.4
79
15
.7
67
þ
20
.4
99
**
A
dj
.R
2
0.
75
79
0.
93
47
0.
55
44
0.
73
62
0.
64
89
0.
58
64
M
od
el
F
(9
,1
7)
31
.1
4*
**
(7
,4
)1
1.
87
*
(9
,2
2)
11
.6
0*
**
(9
,1
1)
12
.9
0
(7
,1
8)
19
.1
1*
**
(9
,2
5)
5.
76
A
IC
92
.9
64
7
21
.5
90
8
10
6.
17
02
48
.4
28
62
66
.5
96
1
94
.7
63
5
M
ea
n
V
IF
13
.1
5
4.
33
5.
13
3.
92
1.
84
2.
19
N
(s
ho
rt
es
ts
er
ie
s)
27
12
32
21
26
35
þ P

0.
10
;*
P

0.
05
;*
*P

0.
01
;*
*P

0.
00
.
Labour’s share in Ireland and Denmark 17
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/m
w
y047/5301501 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 08 July 2019
quite different effects in both economies, effects that deviate strongly from theoretical
expectations. It is in the apparently ‘less liberal’ economy that the benefits of marketization
for the general population are strongest, whereas those benefits in the liberal economy de-
pend more heavily on individual workers’ ability to develop ‘specific assets’ such as high-
tech skills.
The coefficients on consumer prices allow us to explore both the effects of cyclical eco-
nomic downturns, and the correspondence of compensation and productivity as per the
‘wage-lag’ hypothesis. The divergence in price index effects thus suggests that the capacity of
compensation to keep pace with productivity is stronger in Denmark, while the damaging ef-
fect on labour share is faster and negative in Ireland. Although somewhat less clear-cut, it
also appears from the inflation figure that Irish workers’ share of the national pie depends
more heavily on the business cycle, with expansionary periods benefiting labour in Denmark
but capital in Ireland. In short, while Ireland is more vulnerable to business cycle fluctua-
tions and has seen much higher levels of trade exposure and service employment growth, it
is capital that has benefitted most from these trends. However, these trends are not in them-
selves determining of labour’s share—in Denmark, labour has benefited more from these
trends than capital.
4.2 Labour incorporation
Next, we consider an additional model, building on the previous section by examining the
effect of the incorporation of labour under differently mediated processes of marketization
(Table 2, columns 2 and 5). The Irish model measures female labour force participation
from a breakpoint of 1983, in order to the later incorporation of women into the labour
market. As foreign multinational-led employment is an important precursor to changes in la-
bour incorporation in Ireland (acounting for a much greater proportion of employment, and
of collective bargaining pressure than in Denmark), Foreign Direct Investment (fdi) is also
included in the Irish model. Consistent with the ‘social shaping of marketisation’ argument
pursued in the previous section we find striking differences between both countries, in the
effects of incorporation on social groups typically depicted as more ‘vulnerable’ to economic
stressors. Cross-national inequality research suggests that female labour force participation
should raise factor inequality by increasing participation in low-skill and part-time employ-
ment which, coupled with tensions introduced into the balance of work and family
demands, has tended to erode overall union participation (Ebbinghaus et al., 2011, p. 112).
Similarly to the previous model, the historical increases in female labour force participa-
tion and in the proportion of migrants in the labour force have a negative effect on labour
share in Ireland but a positive effect in Denmark. This is likely due to the ability of Danish
public employment to mitigate precarity, coupled with extensive bargaining coverage and a
welfare system aimed toward labour market participation. Furthermore, occupational struc-
ture has remained polarised in Ireland. Dual growth in both high and low-skilled occupa-
tions has led to a two-tier model of female and migrant labour market accession; one of
low-skilled personal services and sales, and another of high-skilled labour associated with
public sector growth. In terms of human capital, women are achieving parity with men in
terms of representation within certain sectors, but this has not translated into proportional
advancements into upper-managerial roles (Turner and McMahon, 2011). Conversely,
Danish flexicurity includes provisions for flexible working hours, negotiation of working
time arrangements at firm level, and the provison of paid leave. Together, these factors offer
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greater balance between work and family life, and long-term career advancement—although
less successful in migrant integration into the labour force (Torfing, 1999; Campbell and
Pedersen, 2007, p. 318).
Counter-intuitively, the effect of unemployment in both contexts is significant and posi-
tive (long-term unemployment did not achieve significance in any specification). Typically,
unemployment has been associated with a reduction in bargaining capacity owing to over-
supplies of labour which tend to depress labour shares, given the increased latitude afforded
firms in the selection process. Kristal (2010) finds such a negative effect, the one variable
where her findings are significantly at variance with ours. However, we see no reason to use
our results to dispute the overall finding but instead trace our results to unuual features of
our case studies. In Denmark, the provisions of the Ghent system, and the extent of bargain-
ing coverage combine to ensure easier transitons between occupations for unemployed
workers. Similarly, the ‘vocational skills’ component of its policy mix have ensured long-
term individual labour market competitiveness through upskilling. These institutions may
weken any negative effects of unemployment, particularly if the unemployment is concen-
trated among the less well paid. The positive labour share effect of unemployment in Ireland
is primarily explained by a combination in the early years of the series of high unemploy-
ment with a weakly developed economy, highly dependent on agriculture and related
labour-intensive sectors. In that sense, the result is an artefact of the combination of two dif-
ferent levels of economic development within the same series.
Finally, working time is non-significant in both cases, albeit with a moderate negative di-
rection in Denmark. Bargaining in the Danish services sector has often focused on the regu-
lation of working hours and conditions beyond those of direct compensation (Sorensen and
Weinkopf, 2009), while its flexicurity measures have ensured commensurate labour market
protections for vulnerable employees; in this sense, it is interesting that aggregate working
hours imply a marginally depressive effect on labour share. In both Ireland and Denmark,
annual working hours have fallen, albeit with substantial variation across sectors, and dif-
ferences in the extent to which clear boundaries between work and private life are demar-
cated (Ciccia and O´ Riain, 2013). Falling working hours, coupled with increased
productivity growth thus appears to present a moderate source of labour share depression
which is especially interesting in the Danish case, where labour politics increasingly focused
on working hours rather than wages over the past 15 years. This is suggestive however, as
such a conclusion is not empirically corroborated here.
4.3 Political–institutional context
One of the main findings of the comparative and US literature on labour share is confirmed
in these models (Table 2, columns 3 and 6). These show that strong unions promote labour’s
gains from the economy, although the effect is strongest in Ireland where union density is
historically much lower. The Irish effect is likely the result of larger potential gains of addi-
tional union membership, and a more substantial ‘union wage premium’ effect characteristic
of LMEs. The presence of foreign firms significantly reduces labour’s share in Ireland (al-
though having no effect in Denmark, where foreign investment rates are lower). This is tell-
ing given that wage rates are generally higher in foreign than domestic firms in Ireland.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Ireland’s capitalism is more ‘red in tooth and claw’ as shares of
national income depend more dramatically on the relative organizational strength of capital
and labour.
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The diverse impact of these factors can perhaps be explained through the different politi-
cal contexts, where Danish social provision is amongst the strongest in Europe’s small open
economies and Ireland’s among the weakest. Stronger welfare spending enhances labour’s
share of income in Ireland on both calculations of the variable. Ireland’s approach to welfare
provision has remained broadly liberal, with high reliance on means-tested income transfers,
and the lowest levels of social services investment of the EU-15 (Kirby, 2008). By contrast,
Denmark remains one of the highest spenders within the OECD on public services and par-
ticularly on active labour market programmes and other forms of ‘social investment’
(Campbell and Pedersen, 2007, p. 317). However, in Denmark, while there is a short-term
effect this quickly turns negative. This suggests that Denmark’s relatively peaceful struggles
at the point of production may well be embedded within a wider trade-off between market
and social wages, where employers can benefit from wage restraint as employees are com-
pensated through social spending (Campbell et al., 2006; Due and Madsen, 2008). The
power resources of capital and labour matter, but the deals they can strike—directly and in-
directly—depend on the broader structure and practices of institutions and the state.
The complex mix of trade-offs and interaction between factors across both cases is evi-
dent, albeit in ways which defy the conventions of the ‘old’ VOC approach. Ireland’s system
of voluntarist union recognition affords greater latitude to employers, while its regime of
fdi-led multinational growth has helped institutionalize a model of union avoidance (Roche,
2001; Lamare et al., 2009). The impact of foreign investment in Denmark is moderated by
close trading links with its geographical neighbours, compared to Ireland’s position as a
global node in a hierarchically integrated export platform. In terms of flexicurity, employers
within LMEs are typically more responsive in the short term to market signals concerning
hiring and firing. The lower securities associated with lower union density in Ireland are
thus mitigated in Denmark with its empahsis on generous unemployment compensation and
higher labour market activation spending which serve to cushion labour market insecurity
(Campbell and Pedersen, 2007, p. 317).
Finally, the effect of partisan party politics is particularly interesting. In both countries,
left party success appears to reduce labour share of income—although the effects are some-
what varied and not very large. While this poses a puzzle as left parties should be more likely
to promote social spending and workplace and employment rights, Huo (2015) has found
that left party strength can reduce labour share by boosting investment and the capital inten-
sity of the economy. He finds that left party strength boosts labour share when labour is
highly skilled but reduces it when labour is predominantly low skilled (and also that left
party strength only boosts labour share when corporatism is strong). The picture is further
complicated by the importance of coalition politics in both countries, despite their very dif-
ferent sizes. In Ireland, the Labour Party have been very much the junior party in occasional
coalitions with a centre-right party, which has tended to dilute their capacity to effect
labour-friendly policy, while in Denmark left parties are typically part of a broader ‘left
coalition’.
In Denmark, a series of Danish parties regularly form a ‘left coalition’ government.
While the results are similar, in practice the dynamics may be different. In Ireland, the dy-
namics of coalition with the centre right party, generally hostile to unions and welfare, may
be to weaken workers over the long run, particularly since many of the issues that served as
common ground in these coalitions related to questions of religiosity and morality rather
than economic and social inequalities. The negative left party effect in Denmark seems to be
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linked to the variation in labour share in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the late 1990s,
economic recovery under the Social Democrats was associated with increased investment
and a decline in labour share, while the Liberal government of the early 2000s oversaw a pe-
riod of credit and consumption driven growth that saw an increase in labour share. This
helps to explain the apparently paradoxical effects of left party strength. This would, per-
haps ironically, be in keeping with Huber et al.’s (2017) finding that right wing parties boost
top incomes (and thus most likely also labour share).
5. Conclusion
Through a comparison of two small open economies with broadly liberal and social demo-
cratic characteristics, we showed that the distribution of national income between capital
and labour is subject to quite different dynamics in different types of political economy. We
found that macro-economic, labour market and political-institutional factors have signifi-
cantly different effects—in magnitude but also direction—in each context.
Methodologically, the effects of individual variables in our parallel national analyses were
broadly similar with the findings from pooled analyses, but we were able to show that the
impact of these factors depends very much on the overall configuration of national political
institutions within a particular ‘world of capitalism’.
Nonetheless, the results of our analyses have thrown up some interesting puzzles. Why
does marketization—in the form of trade and service economy expansion—reduce labour’s
share in liberal Ireland but promote it in ‘coordinated’, social democratic Denmark? Why do
the mechanisms of social protection—unionization and welfare spending—work most strongly
to boost labour’s share in Ireland? Why do some factors we would expect to boost labour’s
share—welfare spending and left parties—sometimes reduce it (and particularly in Denmark,
where we would least expect it)? Our analysis suggests that these puzzles can be answered by
combining power resources and institutionalist accounts of distributional conflict in capitalism
with theories of how market formation and social protection generate dynamic tensions.
We agree with existing literature on labour share trends that emphasizes how the grow-
ing power resources of capital in relation to labour have tended to drive labour’s share of
national income downwards. For example, we find that union density and foreign invest-
ment (measures of the power of labour and capital) significantly affect labour share.
However, we find that these effects vary by national contexts and are greatest where levels
of power resources are weakest. Furthermore, some of the effects of power resources are
quite complex and apparently contradictory, as noted above in our discussion of how left
party governmental strength affects labour share in different ways depending on economic
development trajectory, timing and national context.
Another source of valuable insight into distributional conflicts in capitalism has been the
VOC literature. The original versions of this literature argue that labour gained benefits in
LMEs from general assets tradeable in markets (e.g. general skills) and in CMEs from spe-
cific assets shielded from competition through social and labour market protections.
Workers in LMEs are expected to benefit more from movement towards informational and
innovation economies. We find that workers’ specialized skills (high tech employment) and
collective organization (union density) boost labour share, as expected. However, the effects
of those positive factors are significantly weaker in Denmark, where the basic levels of these
assets (especially unionization) are higher. Where workers have most of these assets, they
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appear to use them least. More telling still, general processes of structural transformation to-
wards the service economy and of marketization (through trade) generate more benefits for
labour in CMEs, not LMEs—turning the original literature’s expectations on their head.
These findings are largely compatible with Thelen’s (2014) reformulation of the Varieties
of Capitalism argument. Examining the varying trajectories of liberaliation in different
forms of capitalism, she argues that as coordinating capacity reduces in Social Democracies,
specific state interventions increase in importance—a conclusion supported by our finding of
the short run effects of welfare spending in Denmark. Similarly, she finds a more extreme
version of this is in Liberal economies where intensified deregulation means that production
level politics becomes ever more important to redistribution. Again, this is supported in the
strong effect of unions in Ireland on increased labour share.
However, our compatibility with Thelen’s argument is subject to two provisos. First,
Thelen overestimates the reduction in the capacity of CMEs to generate significant benefits
from structural change for labour. In fact, this is one of the clearest of our findings.
Profound structural changes—increased proprtions of trade and services in the economy
and of migrants and women in the labour force—all boost labour share in Denmark and re-
duce it in Ireland. The effects of these widespread structural changes depend fundamentally
on national institutional context. Secondly, where our results are most supportive of
Thelen’s argument, is where it departs most from the original VOC distinction between spe-
cific and general assets. Particularly important is her recognition that ‘specific assets’ matter
most in LME contexts where social coordination capacities are weakest, effectively breaking
with a central claim of the earlier literature.
While we find much in our analysis to support Thelen’s (2014) analysis, we also suggest
that there are significant dynamics—particularly in liberal economies—that are underestimated
in both the old and new VOC perspectives. Given this range of options and the relative pre-
dictability and security of their bargaining position, we also find that it is easier for the Danish
to trade market for social wages and short-term for medium-term considerations. This makes
it more likely that they can generate widespread support for large scale economic changes, as
they are better placed to reap the benefits on a broader basis. As ‘empowered market partici-
pants’ (Pontusson, 2011), Danish workers and their organizations are better able to shape
market institutions to their own benefit (Thelen, 2014). This is not without risks, however,
and it is just as likely (if not more so) that Denmark will move over time closer to the Irish
model as it is that Ireland will move towards the Danish. Nonetheless, marketization is
planned but must also take hold in a social structure and this iterative relationship between
marketization and social embedding means that market mechanisms can work in ways that en-
hance the prospects of labour—if the context is one where labour has sufficient power.
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